At the same time it must be emphasized that much more can be made of the talmudic texts on these issues than has been done until now. By careful, symptomatic reading of the Talmuds and cognate texts, the traces of more than one ideological strain can be teased out precisely on this vitally important issue. An underlying assumption upon which this essay will be based is that the amount of energy which a culture expends in order to suppress or marginalize an ideological voice forms a reliable index to the effectiveness of that voice as posing a threat to the hegemonic practices of that culture.3 My major contention is that there was a significant difference between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds with regard to the empowering (or disempowering) of women to study Torah. Both in the Palestinian and in the Babylonian text the dominant discourse suppressed women's voices in the House of Study. These texts, however, provide evidence that in Palestine a dissident voice was tolerated, while in Babylonia this issue seems to have been so threatening that even a minority voice had to be entirely expunged. It must be emphasized, however, that this evidence alone is not self-interpreting because the suppression of this voice in Babylonia could mean two opposite things: either that women never had access to the study of Torah there, or, alternatively-that women often studied Torah in Babylonia, and that this was the source of the panicky reaction shown by the text.
A word should be said about the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds at this point. Ostensibly commentary on the Mishna (redacted Palestine 2d century of the Common Era), they are more like encyclopediae of Jewish culture in the time and place of its production. These texts are multigeneric; we find in them legal commentary, parody and satire, descriptions and prescriptions for medical and magical praxis, and legendary history. Moreover, they comprise materials which were transmitted orally for hundreds of years, and between Palestine and Babylonia and the reverse, finally to be edited into two Talmuds (the Palestinian in the fourth century and the Babylonian in the sixth), and even then the editing was multivocalic. My hope is that the very dialogism and diffusion of authority within the talmudic texts (even though that authority is exclusively male) will provide not only evidence of the hegemonic discourse but also symptoms of dissident voices and realities within the society that impart to women the power of speech in Torah-learning.
Three texts will be read in search of the symptoms of oppositional discourse in Palestinian culture and of its suppression in Babylonia.
Each text belongs to an entirely different literary genre, but they all point in the same direction. In the first section, halakhic (ritual law) texts and their differing versions in the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds will be interpreted, and the second section will focus on a clearly fictional narrative recounting the terrible end of a historical female scholar, the legendary figure Beruriah.
I. Ritual Texts
The first ritual text is a passage in which, counter to the hegemonic view, a prominent rabbi, Ben-Azzai, holds that it is a religious obligation for a father [!] to teach his daughter Torah. We are fortunate in having the legal-hermeneutic responses to this text of two, closely related cultures, as both the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds have interpreted it. The claim that I wish to make is that looking at the differences between the techniques with which each culture rejects Ben-Azzai's view can teach us something about the differential threat that it posed to the social practices of the two Jewish cultures. My main point will be that, while only ambivalently feminist from our point of view, the way that this text is nullified in the Babylonian Talmud is symptomatic of how great a threat it was perceived to be in that culture. The Palestinian tradition, in contrast, seems much more sanguine about the possibility that there could be women among talmudic and Torah scholars.
Interestingly enough, the context of Ben-Azzai's statement is the discussion in the Mishna of the ordeal of the "errant wife." The biblical text, which is found in Numbers 5:11-31, deals with the case of a man who has become jealous of his wife, believing that she has had sexual relations with another. An elaborate ritual ordeal is prescribed, during which the woman drinks water into which this very passage of the Torah has been literally dissolved. If she is innocent, nothing happens, and she is rewarded liberally by God. If she is guilty, however, appalling physical consequences ensue (also from God) from her drinking of these bitter waters.
The Mishna, in accordance with its general practice, goes into great and very specific detail to prescribe the conditions under which the ritual is to be performed and its effects. Immediately after indicating what happens to the guilty woman upon imbibing the water, the text says:
If she had merit, her merit will mitigate [the punishment] for her. On this basis Ben-Azzai said, "A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she drinks [the bitter water], she will know-for merit mitigates." Rabbi Eliezer says, "Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah, teaches her lasciviousness."4 (Mishna Sotah, chapter 3, paragraph 4)
The two Talmuds offer directly opposed interpretations of this text. The Palestinian reading is that the merit which mitigates the punishment is the merit of having studied Torah, and therefore, a father who wishes to protect his daughter should teach her Torah. The Babylonian Talmud, however, although not directly interpreting Ben-Azzai, manages to imply that, according to him, all the father is intended to teach his daughter is the very fact that merit mitigates.5 The reason that such teaching should be important, and indeed why Ben-Azzai should phrase such a limited teaching as "teaching Torah," are questions left unanswered. Moreover, according to that reading, the merit which mitigates is not the merit of knowing Torah but some other merit entirely. According to the Palestinian reading, in contrast, the knowledge that the daughter should have of Torah is in no way restricted to issues having to do with the ritual of the errant wife, and it is the very merit of having studied Torah which stands in her favor. This view would lead then to a practice in which women would have studied 4. For this as the correct reading, see Epstein (1964: 536) . The word which I have translated here as "lasciviousness," tifluth, means literally "childish things" or "foolishness," as we find in the midrash Bamidbar Rabbah 4:20, where we are told of a child who speaks tifluth during prayer, to which his father answers, "What shall I do? He is a child and he plays!" However, it is a frequent euphemism for lasciviousness, as we can see clearly from the following text: "To bring Vashti the Queen before the King in her royal crown" [Esther 1:12]. Rabbi Aibo said, "It is the atonement of Israel that when they eat and drink and are merry, they bless and sing the praises of God; when the nations of the world eat and drink they deal in matters of tifluth: One says Medean women are beautiful, and the other says, Persian women are beautiful. That fool (Ahashuerosh) said to them, 'the vessel that I use is neither Medean nor Persian but Chaldean! Do you wish to see her?' They said, 'Yes, on condition that she is naked'" [Esther Rabbah 3:13]. In this misogynistic context (actually one quite hostile to the King's misogyny-but on this at another time and place), it is quite clear that tifluth has the sense of lasciviousness, and see also Tanhuma Exodus 28, which says that "all kisses are of tifluth, except for the kiss of parting, the kiss of honoring and the kiss of meeting." Finally, the very context of our Mishna supports this interpretation, for the continuation is Rabbi Yehoshua's claim that a woman "prefers one measure of food with tifluth to nine measures with sexual abstinence," i.e., a poor but lusty husband is preferable.
Incidentally, the context of Rabbi Yehoshua's statement suggests that the term is not even being used pejoratively by him, but this needs further investigation. See also Epstein (1964: 670) . 5. In all candor it must be admitted that this is the simplest translation of the text as well, for it is read most easily as, "she will know that merit mitigates." However, as I claim above, this makes the statement practically incoherent, and the Hebrew can be read as I have translated it, which certainly seems to be the Palestinian understanding.
Torah no less than men, for in a situation in which merit is required, the more the better. Since the rabbinic discourse had enormous normative force in Jewish culture, such an interpretation would have had quite radical implications for the status of women in a society where the study of Torah was the most valued of all practices. It leads to a construction of gender in which the roles of the sexes in symbolic life are not nearly as sharply differentiated as they have been in all traditional Mediterranean societies, including Judaism.
Not entirely surprisingly, it was Rabbi Eliezer's view-the antithesis of Ben-Azzai's-which became the accepted religious law.6 What is more surprising is that Ben-Azzai's pronouncement was simply interpreted out of existence in the Babylonian Talmud. The Talmud signals its intention to do away with Ben-Azzai's view by the following, rather dramatic, means. It begins by quoting the entire passage of the Mishna as a lemma for interpretation (which I, like the Talmud, will cite again):
Mishna: Ben-Azzai said, "A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she drinks [the bitter water], she will know-for merit mitigates." Rabbi Eliezer says, "Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah, teaches her lasciviousness."
The Babylonian Talmud thus cites both views of the Mishna; however, at this point, the Talmud says nothing at all about Ben-Azzai and skips right ahead to interpreting Rabbi Eliezer's claim that one who teaches his daughter teaches her sexual impropriety: The first bicolon is undoubtedly generally correct; the second only correct for a certain strain within the culture-hegemonic, to be sure, but not unchallenged by an internal oppositional discourse. The contemporary scholar, rather than criticizing the ideological imposition of the redactorial level of the text, thus inadvertently reiterates it and reinforces the silencing of Ben-Azzai's voice that the Babylonian editor performs.7
Moreover, when the Babylonian Talmud does discuss the issue of what merit it is that mitigates the woman's punishment, the possibility that it is the merit of the study of the Torah is discarded out of handin spite of the fact that the most plausible reading of Ben-Azzai is that he claims it is precisely this merit which is effective here. studied will protect her in her moment of trial. Had they taken this simple path, the entire effort to find an interpretation for the merit which mitigates would have been obviated. However, clearly they have interpreted him to mean that a man should teach his daughter only so much Torah as will enable her to know that, upon drinking the Bitter Water, performance of commandments will protect her. The upshot of this Talmud's refusal to entertain a simple reading of Ben-Azzai forces it ultimately into displacing the merit of the daughter entirely from her own study of Torah to that merit accrued from supporting her husband and male children in their study.9 Now, it is very important to note that even had the Talmud adopted the path of reading Ben-Azzai in accordance with the interpretation I have suggested, this would not have obligated the talmudic rabbis to adopt his view. The alternative view of R. Eliezer is there for the taking, and there was, furthermore, ample support for such an antithetical position in other authoritative texts. The move of interpreting a passage and then rejecting its authority for religious law is, moreover, a very common one in the Talmuds. The Palestinian Talmud, in its treatment of this Mishna, follows exactly this "normal" talmudic practice:
Mishna: Ben-Azzai said, "A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she drinks [the bitter water], she will know-for merit mitigates."
In contrast to the Babylonian, the Palestinian Talmud comments directly on Ben-Azzai:
Palestinian Talmud: R. El'azar Ben-Azariah's opinion contradicts Ben-Azzai, for it is taught that there was an incident in which R. Yohanan ben Broka and R. El'azar Hasma were on their way from Yavne to Lydda and they went to visit R. Yehoshua in Peki'in. He asked them what was innovated in the House of Study today? They answered, We are all your disciples and 9. It should be emphasized that the Babylonian Talmud never directly addresses Ben-Azzai at all, and this is a major premise of my argument. One could argue, therefore, that the rabbis have interpreted Ben-Azzai to mean that there is merit for women in study of Torah and have rejected his view, and that it is only the authoritative position (of the first speaker in the Mishna) that "merit mitigates," which is being interpreted here to mean women's having no merit in the study of Torah. However, in discussing the view of the Mishna's first speaker here, namely, the one who asserts that "merit mitigates," the Talmud, by dismissing entirely the interpretive possibility that it is the merit of Torah which stands for the woman, only emphasizes all the more its total suppression of the dissident voice of BenAzzai. Even if one wishes to claim, therefore, that the Talmud, in interpreting the first speaker, is not making an explicit claim about Ben-Azzai's meaning, such a claim is implied in the total silence which the Talmud maintains on Ben-Azzai as dissenting from this first speaker. Either the rabbis are ignoring his dissent or they are assimilating him to their interpretation of that first speaker; either way his voice is effectively nullified. The dialectical move here is, as I have said, a very common one in both Talmuds. The view of Ben-Azzai has been rejected but, at the same time, interpreted quite straightforwardly, namely, that the father should teach Torah to his daughter because the merit she accrues by studying would be a defense for her. Indeed, were this not their understanding of Ben-Azzai, the objection from the discourse of R. El'azar Ben-Azariah would not be cogent at all, for it is dependent precisely on showing that the latter rabbi held that there is no reward for women in the study of Torah, but that they only come to hear it. rabbis, and indeed they have adopted this style in myriad other cases. The move which the Babylonian Talmud does make here is so much more radical in its rejection of Ben-Azzai, for it does not even allow the meaning of his statement to stand, not even as a rejected minority opinion. It thus erases his voice entirely.
According to the Babylonian interpretation, even
The interpretation current in the Palestinian text and consistent with the simple meaning of Ben-Azzai's language allows us to understand R. Eliezer simply as well. It is precisely the logic of Ben-Azzai's position which he refutes. He agrees, according to this interpretation, that there is merit for women in the study of Torah, but he considers this an undesirable effect. While Ben-Azzai clearly considers protection of the daughter the supreme value, Rabbi Eliezer considers protection of the integrity of the Torah's test to be paramount. The knowledge that Torah protects, together with the knowledge of Torah which would constitute this protection, would remove a major obstacle in the way of her temptation into licentiousness, for she would no longer be afraid of the discovery of her sin and its punishment via the water ordeal.12 On this interpretation, R. Eliezer is a quite straightforward and logical antithesis to Ben-Azzai. The Babylonian Talmud, by refusing to entertain the simplest interpretation of Ben-Azzai, is forced then into rather fantastic interpretations of R. Eliezer, such as the following: Said R. Abbahu: What is the reason for the statement of R. Eliezer? As it is written,"I am Wisdom, I dwelt with guile [and knowledge will find inAzzai's position as normative, neither does it find it so shocking that it has to be suppressed. Indeed, it would not be inconceivable to find someone who only had the Palestinian Talmud as a normative source deciding in favor of the view of BenAzzai. It should be remembered that, according to the Talmud, the very reason for the Mishna's citing rejected and minority opinions is to make them available for future authorities who could see reasons to revive them. To be sure, the Palestinian Talmud relates a story indicating how extreme a misogynist R. Eliezer was, but that hardly constitutes an argument for general approbation of his position since in that story even his son is astonished at his behavior, and R. Eliezer is typically regarded as an heterodox and extreme personality. Thus the interpretation of R. Eliezer promoted by the Babylonian Talmud 14 has the study of Torah as a direct cause of lasciviousness in women. I submit that this is a much less plausible construction of R. Eliezer than the one I have proposed above, for, while the one I have given makes R. Eliezer a logical response to Ben-Azzai's argument, this one renders his remark only tangentially relevant to that claim. Moreover, it is a two-edged sword, for if the point of his observation is indeed that the study of Torah leads in general to negative moral effects, then why only in women? Indeed, Rabbi Abbahu's statement only emphasizes this paradox, as my punctuation is meant to suggest. Everyone should be discouraged from the study of Torah-a consequence R. Eliezer certainly did not foresee for his discourse, nor one that R. Abbahu would have wanted to adopt either.
It seems to me fairly well established, then, that the most straightforward way to read Ben-Azzai's discourse is the way that it was understood in the Palestinian Talmud. The fact, then, that any readings of this text which occur in the Babylonian Talmud and later universally adopt the other interpretation is evidence for an effort (conscious or otherwise) to entirely expunge the radical implications of Ben-Azzai's opinion; and this in a tradition which is quite unembarrassed generally-indeed enthusiastic-about the existence of opinions dissenting from the accepted practice.
As an explanation for this phenomenon, I wish to suggest that BenAzzai's utterance, while given in a context which is for us ambivalent from a feminist standpoint, was perceived from within the Babylonian Jewish culture as being "feminist" dynamite, a line of thought that would have been explosive for the structure of gender roles in the society and, therefore, could not even have been allowed existence as a rejected minority opinion. The ease, on the other hand, with which the Palestinian Talmud regards Ben-Azzai's view, even while probably not accepting it as authoritative,15 may be taken as probative evidence that a woman's studying Torah was a less threatening circumstance in the culture that produced that document.
13. The word for "intrigues" in the biblical text, mezimot, is generally used in talmudic discourse to refer to sexual transgression. I believe that this association may be underlying R. Abbahu's citation of this verse in a context where sexual license is the issue at hand. 14. Paradoxically, R. Abbahu himself is Palestinian, but that does not matter here since I am arguing for the ideological positions manifested by the editors of the two Talmuds, and it is in Babylonia that his view was preserved and transmitted, while in the Palestinian text it is ignored. 15. But see note 11, above. The Tosefta, a major Palestinian text of the ritual law (redacted slightly later than the Mishna), speaking history inadvertently, provides us with further strong support for the suggestion that there was a fundamental difference between Palestine and Babylonia with regard to the issue of women's studying Torah. The Tosefta explicitly avers that "gonorrheics, menstruants and parturants are permitted to read the Torah, to study Mishna, midrash, religious law and aggada, but men who have had a seminal emission may not."16 R. Eliezer Waldenberg, an important living rabbinical authority, observes that this text takes it as a matter of course that it is permitted for women to study all of these branches of Torah, and the only issue dealt with is whether they are permitted to do so in certain physical situations (Waldenberg n.d.: ch. 3).17 The Palestinian Talmud quotes this passage from the Tosefta in its original form.18 The question raised by Waldenberg is, given that this is so, how is it that the later religious law forbids the study of Torah for women? His answer is that this Palestinian source follows Ben-Azzai's view, while the Babylonian Talmud follows R. Eliezer's. As support for this connection, he cites the Babylonian Talmud's version of this very Tosefta, which reads, "Gonorrheics and lepers and those who have had intercourse with menstruants are permitted to study Torah, etc." 19 He argues that the Palestinian source has actually been rewritten in its passage to Babylonia, "since the [Babylonian Talmud] holds like R. Eliezer that it is entirely forbidden for women to study Torah and not like Ben-Azzai, it omitted the menstruants from that law and included only the men" (ibid.).
As we shall see below, it is this very text, the Tosefta, which also cites a woman as an authority in religious law. The menstruants who can study Torah in Palestine undergo a sex change into men who have slept with menstruants in Babylonia. Once more we have evidence, therefore, that in Babylonia any voice dissenting from the stricture on the study of Torah by women was simply interpreted (or in this case, edited) out of existence. Having proposed this context, we can begin to read the legend of Beruriah, the female Torah sage, as part of a significant cultural practice.
II. The Legend of Beruriah
If we do entertain the notion that Athenian citizen-wives had at least certain kinds of informal power, we must also be clear that it was socially necessary for men not to acknowledge it-to deal with it at most indirectly through In the Talmud itself, all we are told is that Rabbi Meir ran away to Babylonia because of the "incident of Beruriah." The Talmud tells no more. Our narrative is found only in the important medieval French second I disagree. Neither of these ritual situations is so common as to be what any member of a rabbinic household would have observed-indeed, they (certainly the first) are presented as unusual situations. Moreover, the first narrative internally contradicts Goodblatt's claim. If the daughter were simply reporting the household practice, how come her brother had a different suggestion? There is even one version of this text (and quite an important one indeed; see n. 28, below) in which it was herfather whom she bested here; that version, at any rate, would entirely forestall Goodblatt's claim that this was knowledge the girl had picked up from seeing her household's practice. The story suggests in both cases, rather, that the woman (or girl) in question had an understanding of religious-law principles which she could apply to specific hypothetical situations, and the text in both cases strongly marks its approbation of her knowledge, a fact that will be of some importance below.
On the basis of these two traditions, it is less surprising that the Babylonians regarded these as two stories of the same woman. In fact, I would suggest that the literary similarity of the two narratives suggests that they may be variants of the same basic story. It certainly seems from this text, moreover, that Beruriah was a well-known figure in the Palestinian tradition as well. commentator on the Talmud, Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, the famous Rashi. The story recounts an ugly tale of entrapment and suicide. Rabbi Meir, to prove a point to his proud wife, has her seduced and disgraced (not so incidentally disgracing himself and his student in the bargain). This aberrant legend about the behavior of one of the greatest rabbis of the Talmud towards a wife otherwise presented as pious, wise, respected, and loved demands historicization and explanation, and, to be sure, in both the traditional and scholarly literature, a great deal has been written about this text. Recently, a very powerful and moving feminist reading of this story has been published by Rachel Adler (1988) .21 I am in sympathy with the general thrust of her text and its reading practice ("Retelling it from the world in which we stand, we can see how character strains against context, how it shakes assumptions about what it means to be a woman, a Jew, a sexual being"), but I wish here to present another reading of the text, "retelling it from the world in which we stand," but attempting also to learn more from it about the world in which it was told. The main This seems a misreading of the text, and one with serious consequences for our understanding of the place of legitimate Eros in rabbinic culture. The Mishna's text does not read, "All love which is dependent on sexual desire," but, "love which is dependent on something," that is, love with an ulterior motive versus "love which is disinterested." The point of the comment is that love developing from the fulfillment of some particular need in the lover is not true love and will only last as long as the need exists and the beloved fulfills it. The story of Amnon and Tamar is, in fact, a very apt illustration of this, for once Amnon had raped his sister, the Bible tells us, not only did he no longer love her, but he hated her. What do these surrealistic situations represent if not a passionate attempt to capture some elusive truth by smashing context? Imagining Beruriah must be regarded as just such an effort-a straining for a more encompassing context, an outrageous test case proposed as a challenge to all contextually reasonable assumptions: What if there were a woman who was just like us? (Ibid.) The ambivalence of Beruriah's story is read by Adler, then, as a single cultural unit representing that ambivalence as follows: "While it is threatening to imagine being ridiculed and exposed by a woman too learned and powerful to be controlled, it is also moving to imagine being loved and befriended by her. Thus the rabbis, in describing the domestic life of Beruriah and Meir, portray Beruriah as a feminine version of the ideal study partner" (ibid.: 32). The story of her downfall, then, is a solution to the negative pole of the ambivalence.
22. In context, she certainly seems to mean Palestine in 200 c.E., that is, the time of the historical Beruriah, and "B.C.E." would then be a misprint.
23. Goodblatt (1975) also argues for this historical difference, but in a quite different direction from the reading proposed here.
Moreover, the very intimacy of the relationship with the ideal study partner, when that partner is potentially a woman, makes it impossible for Beruriah to fit in, on Adler's reading. "Authority in rabbinic Judaism flowed through the medium of rabbinic relationships, and the rabbis could not imagine how to give Beruriah authority without including her in the web of rabbinic relationships-the web of teachers and students and study partners. And they could not imagine doing that without also imagining her sexuality as a source of havoc" (ibid.).
In contrast to this reading of Beruriah's story as a solution to a generic anomaly in the rabbinic culture, I propose to read it as an exemplum of a very specific principle, namely, R. Eliezer's statement that "anyone who teaches his daughter Torah, teaches her lasciviousness."24 Beruriah is, after all, the very paradigm case of a daughter whose father taught her Torah. If R. Eliezer's dictum is true, in the way that the Babylonian Talmud understood it-namely, that there is an intrinsic connection between the woman studying Torah and sexual immorality-then Beruriah's fall into licentiousness is a structural necessity. Any other denouement to her biography would constitute a refutation of R. Eliezer. Another way of putting this would be to say that the same cultural forces in the Babylonian rabbinic com-24. Compare the reading of Aliza Shenhar (1976), who argues that the story attempts to exemplify R. Meir's great zeal to prove the truth of rabbinic dicta, in this case, that "women are light-headed." That is, on her reading, the text is prepared to defame the wife in order to present a positive [!] picture of the husband. It would be a strange storyteller who imagined this story of entrapment as a positive one of the rabbi. My reading, namely, that the storyteller is prepared to defame both husband and wife to preserve the force of R. Eliezer's opinion, seems much more plausible. Cynthia Ozick has gotten much closer to this reading in her suggestion that "to punish her for her impudence, a rabbinic storyteller, bent on mischief toward intellectual women, reinvented Beruriah as a seductress. She comes down to us, then, twice notorious: first as a kind of bluestocking, again as a licentious woman. There is no doubt that we are meant to see a connection between the two" (Ozick 1979: 44) . I wonder, however, why Ozick makes it worse by turning Beruriah into the seducer, rather than the seduced, and only the seduced after much resistance. See also Schwarzbaum (1983: 69-70), who argues that the story is a realization of an international folk topos, the best of women seduced. This element is surely part of the story, but is by no means enough to explain it entirely and certainly not its presence here. See Boyarin (1990) . None of the interpreters known to me except Adler has pointed out the parallels between the stories of the two sisters, but she reads them differently: "It is no coincidence that Rashi juxtaposes his story to the story of Meir's adventure in Rome. The two stories share several motifs. In both, Meir conducts a chastity test. In both, female sexuality brings shame and causes Meir to leave home. In both, women are assumed to be solely responsible for sexual behavior, even when pressured, deceived, or entrapped by men" (1988: 103). I believe that my analysis of the contrastiz,e structure between the two tales, and the way that the earlier one clones itself in mirror image, as it were, to produce the later, only strengthens Adler's points about how the story represents women. munity which did not even permit Ben-Azzai's voice to be retained as minority opinion could not tolerate the exceptional case of even one woman learned in the Torah. The horror of her end, the extraordinary lengths to which the text goes, even defaming one of its greatest heroes to achieve its purpose, is once again a symptom of the extraordinary threat that the learned woman represented to the Babylonian (and later European) rabbinic culture, a power that threatened to upset the whole applecart of gender relations and social organization, and that had to be suppressed, therefore, by extraordinary means. The best context, then, for interpreting this legend is, in my reading, the discussion of ritual law, above, whereby the differential between the Palestinian and Babylonian texts is reproduced in the differential between the readings of Beruriah in these two traditionsin both she is anomalous, but only in one does she become a scandal.
In the rest of this section, I wish to deepen and extend this reading of the text of Beruriah's end as being generated specifically in the intertextual web of the Babylonian talmudic tradition. Although the story of Beruriah's seduction and suicide is only extant in Rashi's authoritative eleventh-century French commentary on the Babylonian Talmud, yet I think I can show how it was generated there and why it is not a fluke in Rashi.25 The story of the production of this text will strengthen the connection between it and its hypogram, the saying of R. Eliezer. Beruriah had, according to the Talmud, a double, in fact, a sister. In the wake of her father's martyrdom for rebellious teaching of the Torah, the Romans condemned her to a life of prostitution in Rome. Beruriah could not stand the thought of her sister in that situation and sent R. Meir to Rome to rescue her. The Babylonian Talmud relates:
He took a tarqeva of coins and went, saying that if she has not done anything forbidden, there will be a miracle; while if she has done forbidden things, there will be none. He went disguised as a cavalry officer and said to her, be with me. She said to him, but I am menstruating. He said to her, I am burning with passion. She answered, there are many here much lovelier than I. He said (to himself), I understand from this that she has done 25. The story is generally regarded by scholars as quoted by Rashi from an earlier source or oral tradition. There is nothing in his text to indicate that he is inventing it. The text of the Talmud does refer simply to "the incident of Beruriah," as in other cases where the story itself is not told and Rashi supplies it. In nearly all other cases of this type, the earlier source can be traced. One is entirely justified, therefore, in seeing this story as the production of later Babylonian talmudic tradition. For discussion of this question, see Goodblatt (1975) R. Meir, the miracle worker, performs his miracle (an allusion to the miracle performed for the innocent wife), and the sister of Beruriah is saved. As a result of this activity, however, R. Meir ends up having to run away to Babylonia. But according to another tradition, the Talmud tells us, it was not because of this that he ran away but because of the "incident of Beruriah." That is all that the Talmud itself tells of the story of Beruriah. But we know from the Talmud something more of the story of this other daughter of R. Hanina. The Talmud asks what she did to deserve such a fate and answers that she would not have suffered had she not brought it on herself in some way. "R. Yohanan said, Once his daughter was walking in front of Roman nobles. They said, how lovely are the steps of this maiden! She began to be very careful of her steps." As usual in rabbinic discourse, "the punishment fits the crime." She wished to attract Roman men; now that is her "profession." Now we can begin to construct the picture. This daughter embodied in her behavior precisely the rabbinic dictum that women are light-minded and lascivious. To be sure, she had a terrible experience, but by strength of character, she passed the test of R. Meir and, by miracles, was saved from her fate. Presumably, she lived happily ever after.
Her sister Beruriah's story is the exact structural opposite. She began as the very antithesis of the light-minded and lascivious girl; indeed, she was interested from girlhood in the Torah and in wisdom. She is represented over and over as the embodiment of morality. When the time comes, she is also tested by R. Meir, but unlike her sister, she fails the test. The consequence of her exemplary life is ignominious suicide. Her story, only tantalizingly hinted at in the Talmud and told only in its margins, is generated by simply reversing the polarity of every element in the sister's story, which is told in the text of the Talmud itself. One sister becomes the exemplum of proper womanly behavior because her father conducted himself properly, in accordance with R. Eliezer, and did not train her away from lightmindedness. The other daughter dies a wanton because her father (the same father) violated the taboo, submitted to temptation, and taught his daughter Torah.
My claim, then, is that this story is generated as the dark double of the sister's story out of the matrix of the Babylonian understanding of R. Eliezer, namely, that there is an essential nexus between a woman's studying The paradoxes of these oppositions, and the reversal of the usual expectations of reward and punishment, mark all the more strongly this narrative's significance as an exemplum of the danger of teaching a daughter Torah. But I again emphasize that this explanation for the story is intelligible only on the Babylonian Talmud's interpretation of the Mishna. This story is not told in, nor does it fit in with, the Palestinian interpretation, where Ben-Azzai holds that there is real merit for women in studying Torah. Moreover, even R. Eliezer's view, according to the Palestinian reading, is that there is merit for women in studying Torah, and that this merit would protect them from punishment for adultery, thus removing the very deterrent which the Bitter Water is meant by the Torah to be. On that interpretation of R. Eliezer, there is no necessary and essential causal relation between a woman's studying Torah and sexual license, and indeed, in the Palestinian texts there is no hint of censure of Beruriah or her father for teaching her Torah. She is certainly an anomaly in Palestine as well, but her halakhic opinion was cited as authoritative and her dicta to her husband on moral and religious issues quoted only with approbation.
On my reading then, the legend of Beruriah is precisely the sort of ambivalent, troubled acknowledgment/denial of women's autonomy, and intellectual achievement, as in the Greek plays or the legends of Amazons to which Winkler refers, although, to be sure (and this is important), it is not until the story's grotesque end is supplied in the medieval commentary that the denial which the Babylonian Talmud achieves in regard to the other texts considered is consummated with regard to Beruriah as well. It is difficult to find any historical context for these issues precisely because, as we have seen, the energy expended to suppress this autonomy was so great. However, the material discussed by Bernadette Brooten (1982) The relevance of Brooten's work has recently been a subject of discussion. Shaya Cohen, a historian who accepts her reading of the evidence, has nevertheless argued that since the inscriptions come from the nonrabbinic communities of Crete, Thrace, Italy, and North Africa, they are not relevant for the history of that form of Judaism which achieved historical hegemony-talmudic Judaism (Cohen 1980 : 27-28). In contrast, Judith Plaskow contends that precisely the evidence for nonrabbinic forms of ancient Judaism "leads us to question rabbinic authority as the sole arbiter of authentic Judaism," and that "texts may reflect the tensions within patriarchal culture, seeking to maintain a particular view of the world against social, political or religious change" (Plaskow 1990 : 45). I do not intend to enter into the theological questions involved here, but it certainly seems relevant to me to emphasize that these readings do bring those tensions home, as it were, locating them within the talmudic texts and thus the rabbinic discourse and power structure themselves. They certainly help to answer the questions that Brooten raises, "Could Jewish women actually have been scholars? Could they have had some say about the reading of the bible in the synagogue?" (Brooten 1982: 55) .
The geographical marginality of the inscriptional data is disappointing, however, in another respect, as it does not help us evaluate the evidence presented here for any greater anxiety about learned women in the rabbinic community of Babylonia than in Palestine. Does this represent more or less Torah study by Babylonian women than by their Palestinian sisters? There is, perhaps, one piece of tantalizing evidence for the first possibility, however. In the very text that denies a woman any merit for the study of Torah, the conclusion is that her merit comes from "her taking her sons to study Torah and Mishna." But this passage could, as well, be translated, "from teaching her sons Torah and Mishna"-in fact, this is the literal, grammatical reading of the phrase. In order to teach, she obviously must have learned. This would strongly suggest that the energetic denial of any merit for women in the study of Torah which we observe in Babylonia, and indeed, the erasure in the Babylonian Talmud of the Palestinian remarks on women's studying, are more a "wishful" prescriptive determination than a reflection of actual social conditions. We could then interpret the evident threat of the texts which denote women's studying as owing to the fact that women did study in that culture, and it is this which explains the greater anxiety of the Babylonian Rabbis.27
Within a literary, cultural tradition, there are always forces contending for hegemony. This is at least as true in the heterogeneous texts of the Talmuds produced over hundreds of years and in two, separated geographical areas as it is in Shakespeare, where cultural studies also find both patriarchal hegemony and forces contending against it. The Babylonian tradition, with Rashi as its definitive interpreter, achieved hegemony in medieval and postmedieval Jewish culture. Within the ancient Jewish texts, however, there is also vivid dissent from the exclusion of women from the study of Torah. The texts we have read here, precisely in the differing ways that they suppress this dissent, provide symptoms of a cultural difference between Palestine and Babylonia, suggesting that, while in Babylonia it was unthinkable and terrifying that a woman might study Torah, in Palestine it was merely uncustomary and noteworthy.28 I would claim much more than Brown (1988) for the possibilities of learning cul-27. Indeed, seen in this light, the persistent legends that Rashi's daughter was a medieval "Beruriah" (moreover, without coming to any evil end) become highly charged as well. 28. I am not forgetting, however, R. Eliezer's misogyny, which is also Palestinian, of course. It is not my intention to reify either of these cultures into one monolithic position, nor even to claim that the Palestinian culture was anything like egalitarian, but only to surmise that dissent on this issue was better tolerated there. In truth, it is important to add another set of complications and systematic doubts here. Despite my remarks above, in note 25, it is nearly impossible to determine for certain whether Rashi's story really has a Babylonian provenance or perhaps a later European one. Another rabbinic authority, slightly later than Rashi, has quite a different understanding of the "incident of Beruriah." His tradition includes, not the "incident of Beruriah," but the "precedent of Beruriah," and the "real story" is that R. Meir was exiled for not listening to his wife on a point of ritual law! Furthermore, according to this same authority, it was not her brother that she bested in knowledge and acumen (see above, n. 20) but her father, the great scholar R. Hanina himself, which establishes her even more firmly as an actual halakhic authority (Kalonymos 1963: 31-34). According to R. Yehuda ben Kalonymos's tradition, then, the story of Beruriah is a decisive refutation of R. Eliezer's dictum. Is one of these exactly opposite texts the authentic Babylonian tradition? Or are both authentic Babylonian traditions-reflecting a point of social conflict within that culture? Or is one or both of them a medieval European product? Do they represent different cultures and power relations or, perhaps, only individual psychological differences? tural history from the talmudic texts. We must very carefully teaserative in a more cogent social framework, no one would be more delighted than myself.
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